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Philippine Counterinsurgency Success: Implications for the Human Domain of Warfare
Warfare centered on defeating enemies who cloak themselves in the human activity of the modern, increasingly interdependent, and virtually connected world of the 21st Century…is profoundly different from that required to dominate in the traditional Land Domain.
-ADP 3-05 1
To Influence is to Prevail
Background -The Human Domain is Defining Itself; Implications for U.S. Army Global Strategic Landpower Dominance
In its foundational doctrine publication the U.S. Army says:
U.S. forces operate in the air, land, maritime, space and cyberspace domains. The land domain is the most complex of the domains, because it addresses humanity-its cultures, ethnicities, religions, and politics…The distinguishing characteristic of the land domain is the presence of humans in large numbers. 2 I disagree. The distinguishing characteristics of the land domain are twofold. It is the most geographically complex domain, making it the most difficult to operate within, and it hosts the human domain, the most complex of the domains. As dissimilar as mountainous jungles are to the arctic tundra, humans have adapted to thrive in these, and other, environments. Humans are logical, thinking beings, and of the over seven billion on our planet, no two are exactly alike.
Daily human interaction occurs in many ways. Although most interaction is positive, some is not. In most instances, negative interaction is intended to modify behavior, to influence outcomes, and when coupled with a political goal and sufficient scale, it can result in war. War is unfortunately an ageless tool. Clausewitz appropriately and timelessly labeled it as "an act of violence intended to compel our enemy to fulfill our will...a continuation of political activity by other means." 3 There are various types of conflicts with unique characteristics, often only common to the time period of human history in which they occur. For that reason, "wars in every period have independent forms and independent conditions, and, therefore, every period must have its independent theory of war." 4 This then isn't a paper about the theory of war, but about whether it is time to clearly identify the uniquely important role all people play in modern war, not just organized combatants. Further, it is time to examine whether there is a valid intersection between the concept of human security and the reality of globalization.
That intersection, if you contend that today's wars have been mostly wars amongst people and not only wars between people, looks a lot like its own entity, a new domain of warfare. That domain is the human domain. And if it is indeed new and distinct from the land domain, inanimate and geographic, we in our Nation's Army should be preparing ourselves to better understand its implications. We may need to adapt how we choose to look at this operating space, how and who we train, and what it is we can capitalize on by pitting our most important resource, our Soldiers, against this newly refined task. We can accomplish this task, which thankfully, remains true to the essence of the Army's longstanding role.
As Army Chief of Staff General Raymond Odierno relates, "Direct engagement with people has always been, and remains, a core strength of the United States Army." 5 If we can optimize how we learn to better operate amongst the world's occupants in a manner that meets our national security goals, we will surely maximize the opportunity to prevent conflict between humans. As an Army, we can play our critical role in shaping the international environment to enable our partners and contain our enemies.
Finally, we will be ready to win, and win decisively, by best meeting security requirements that involve close human interaction and maintain an astute understanding of today's complex world. 6 We may never be able to accurately predict the type of war we're about to enter, but our preparations and understanding of contingencies will allow us a better understanding of its likely characteristics. Some we've seen before; some will be new.
For this paper, I'll focus on war that is most common in this day and age. Today's war is most often not what we would consider traditional state-on-state, or organized army against army on well-defined battlefields. I'm not saying we won't see that again, or that's it's less likely, simply that this isn't the type of warfare most of us have recently experienced. Some would argue that this former type will regain its fashion, in particular due to increasing state capabilities and potential conflict over diminishing resources.
Although we're a long way from a global order that doesn't engender nationalism by its very construct, where we'll respond to conflict and why it started are not relevant to the point of this paper. In all instances, we'll deal with human activity and more people than ever will be involved either way. I'll instead focus on what is most frequent today, war amongst the people, excellently described by General Rupert Smith as: a graphic description of modern warlike situations, and also a conceptual framework: it reflects the hard fact that there is no secluded battlefield upon which armies engage, nor are there necessarily armies, definitely not on all sides…war amongst the people is different: it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields-all the people, anywhereare the battlefield.
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I have chosen to look at this topic from the perspective of our Army, the most agile, adaptable and capable force in the world. 8 It has always done more than our Nation expected of it, and it always will. Our Army has been expertly composed of thinking, adaptable, flexible humans from a great cross section of American society. Its doctrine empowers leadership, decision, and action down to the lowest level. Each
Soldier is respected as an individual, each being crucial to the Army's success.
Everyone plays a key role, important to the understanding of the concept of human security. In short, every individual is critical to the overall Army, as they always have
been. So what has changed?
A Lens Through Which We're Viewed
In September of 2012 the United Nations (UN) General Assembly formally issued a statement on its common understanding for human security, a concept in discussion since the mid-1990's. Although the differentiation of the concept from the basic tenets of western liberalism continues to be debated, its fundamental points make sense particularly in light of how globalization has affected today's security environment.
There are more of us on the planet, and we're closer to all being within arm's reach than we ever thought possible. In brief, the UN has articulated that people have the right "to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty, and despair." Further, all humans are "entitled to freedom from fear and freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their human potential." 9 Human security, how we coexist, has long been established and refined in the United States through the fundamental constitutional rights of every individual. These beliefs, framed from our values, are progressing globally as humanity advances, although not as evenly or quickly as we'd like to see. This is particularly important in regions of the world where the value of human life, often due to exceedingly challenging conditions and commensurate competition for limited resources, is not routinely measured by comparable ideals. The challenges humans face have always been with us, as they always will be, so the components of human security shouldn't surprise 5 anyone and are not fundamentally different from anything we've considered in the past. 10 What does surprise many, though, is the relative size and interconnectivity of today's world, so a closer look at this concept perhaps offers us another angle from which to explore the problem, and identify its inherent opportunities.
Ideally, those particular areas where humans live, formerly physically and psychologically remote, also often potential zones of conflict and instability, will someday be prosperous regions where dignity, hope, prosperity and being content are fully manifested. We're not there yet, and as a result, the concepts of human security can have immediate implications for the employment of the strategic tools at our disposal to secure, and if required influence, those humans where they're found, whatever environment they've chosen or find themselves in. In fact, if we truly capture its essence, we'll likely be better prepared to win by not fighting. In today's world, actions performed by few are seen by many. We must ensure those strategic effects continue to work in our favor.
Our Nation's force of strategic landpower, the Army, is "the most powerful deterrent to aggression against U.S. interests worldwide, and its dominance must remain unquestioned. Strategic landpower results from possessing unequalled capacity in both human and land domains." 16 Human behavior, whether state or non-state, is 9 warfare's millennia-old object of influence. Sun Tzu, the Chinese theorist of war, wrote more than 2,000 years ago, "The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting." 17 However, if a force must fight to physically ensure that influence, then "the only geography that can really be controlled is the only geography that lends itself physically to human occupation, the land…it is the very character of land warfare to hold at risk…civil society…." 18 Simply put, land forces operating amongst humans seeking to effect change in their behavior are forces of strategic landpower.
Although the objective remains unchanged, the arsenal of tools at landpower's disposal has evolved and can generally be organized into word or deed categories.
War has both physical and psychological dimensions that allow employing forces to compel and lead enemies and non-combatants to act. 19 The degree to which those tools can yield a power that produces effect, either desired or unintended, determines when and how they are employed. When employing strategic landpower amongst people, it remains paramount to act and to assist appropriate elements of the international community committed to "an international order that promotes just peace." 20 As a result, strategic landpower forces must understand the myriad implications for human security within that human domain in which they've been sent to act. Those implications constantly evolve through refined acceptable responsibilities that protect all human life, understandable to a force of strategic landpower. This evolution is particularly important and beneficial for the vast majority of humans directly impacted by military interaction, non-combatants, and one of the primary reasons why there is now a human domain. serve to legally improve protections for non-combatants, as well as develop legal safeguards to ensure many inhumane elements of technology were not incorporated into warfare's arsenal. To that point, the domain of warfare, as it was principally force on force, was where that force was found. Battle was taken to the enemy, either to terrain he wanted, or to his army, a manifestation of his power. There are many great examples, and Napoleon's campaigns are but some examples of how it was quite effectively done. However, here we begin to see how his conditions were different than today's, and why our understanding should adapt to that difference. To put it into perspective, Napoleon's armies marched on a planet of approximately one billion humans, individuals mostly armed with farm implements unless they had a closely controlled weapon assigned by their state, lived in the United States, or carried a bow, spear, rock, or knife.
Why is Today any
Today, there are approximately seven billion people on earth, many of whom possess some type of personal firearm. It is estimated that there are now upward of 500 million small arms worldwide, 100 million which are Kalashnikov variants. 21 The complexities of operating on land continue to reflect the complexities of human life on our planet. Add to that increased number of weapons ubiquitous long-range communications tools and mechanisms, near-instant visual imaging and their commensurate worldwide interconnectivity, and the friction of human competition, and the sense of that complexity begins to come into focus. With more humans and urbanization, the ability to hide in plain sight has exponentially grown. As a result, human combatants now often have to be dealt with individually, as do non-combatants through human security principles, which when combined with those challenges and effects of globalization sheds further light on the human domain. However, with increasing complexity also come opportunities. In this case, we can continue to excel at meeting our Nation's security objectives, while better ensuring we respect and defend human security and contend with the increasing number of humans in and around where landpower must operate. Strategic landpower can thrive in the human domain by tailoring its focus from the terrain to what is most strategic, the human population. In fact, to this end, applying less of what is more suited may in the end be more appropriate. Our goal should then be for the right humans, properly enabled, to engage for maximum influence the right humans.
A broader understanding of, and strategic approach towards, humans doesn't mean that we intend to be all things to all people. It should however mean that when we operate, we should continue to do it right. By being more specifically right, we can have great effect. To that end, the concept of human security is not simply synonymous with the doctrine of responsibility to protect. The human security concept posits that freedom from fear is a fundamental right of every human being, every day of his or her life. Responsibility to protect is a perspective governing how states must protect their 14 populations from "avoidable catastrophe…but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states." 24 Where we are applied is up to our policy leaders on behalf of the American people. It does however remain our job to provide options on how we can best operate to achieve the desired effect we're intended to have. That effect will always involve humans, and operations within the human domain are paramount, as well as being the most complex.
By refining, as needed, application of strategic landpower for any challenges to our collective security interests we can present more policy options to minimize conflict and attain positive outcomes.
A Human Domain Operational Success
The Republic of the Philippines is a recent successful model of the inherent understanding of the human domain of warfare, as well as an example of positive application of an understanding of how that domain is critical to the responsibility to protect and enforce human security. The Philippines has closely examined the concept of human security within the human domain in the modern era, mid-stride in the conduct of a long-standing military campaign, and effected a positive operational change based upon a clearer understanding of what was needed. In short, they made it work. They were able to adapt; they had the right people; they were able to evolve their approach while under tremendous pressure to succeed, while retaining the positives from prior approaches in which they'd dedicated almost 30 years of struggle.
The former operating environment of the Armed Forces of the Republic of the Philippines was a combination of the domains of land, water, and air. For decades, they put their implements of war to use, in a traditional sense, across these domains. They Without a solid common foundation towards greater good, they can become isolated from each other and cause uniquely challenging security situations to evolve.
What is acceptable, and likely the key to Philippines' counterinsurgency success, is that it experienced a strategic change in perspective to its modern counterinsurgency approach, a change that evolved as the seemingly endless conflict, principally against a complex internal religious insurgency must be like. To the GPH, the population is now much more than an unconcerned bystander to an internal force-on-force scenario. As a former Philippine Western Mindanao Command (WESMINCOM) Commanding General (CG) most clearly stated, "we're not at war with our own people," a critical but often seemingly overlooked point in counterinsurgency. 25 
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The population, humans, became the domain in an archipelago of islands, water, and air space, within which the security forces had to operate. Unlike one of the approaches used against the communist New People's Army, population relocation was not an option. Muslims have long lived in the Philippines and with indigenous Filipino peoples possess significant claims to ancestral domains. The overall strategy of the GPH then owes its success to its ability to influence the long-term behavior of all elements of its society, whether they are insurgents, support the insurgency, are uncommitted, or support the government. Governments must govern, generally through the will of their populations who consent to governance, and as a result their behavior enables that governance to flourish. So in essence the mechanism for the GPH to prevail in its long-standing counterinsurgency operations was to protect its entire population, supportive or non-supportive, from itself by operating for it, and within its midst where its projection of national intent was most needed. They needed to be seen as having the ability to govern, to make a difference, and to be an acceptable control mechanism to a formerly ignored population hundreds of miles south and thousands of islands away from Manila. The focus of the GPH then became its people, not its geography, causing a natural evolution from the formerly unsuccessful physical domaincentric approach to what makes their government required and feasible, its human population. They entered into and operated within the human domain.
More than simply looked at as terrain to maneuver over, through, or around, the human population was essentially viewed as an operational domain in and of itself. The GPH reflected on the population through a series of lenses, including physical, social, demographic, religious, multi-cultural, indigenous, settled, and psychological issues. As a result, and certainly not without understanding of the tremendous complexity, the GPH strategically served to immerse itself in the element that, until essentially the past five years, had been at best misunderstood, and at worst, ignored due to myriad historical factors. A few strategic schools of thought, perhaps led by one that believed remote populations could be ignored, conveniently allowed the central government to principally focus on the mainland of Luzon, while successive bands of influence decreased until, separated by different culture, language, and importantly religion, the extreme southern reaches of the Philippines fell somewhere between being ignored and tolerated; both clearly unacceptable. This intolerance and focus on differences, easier to justify in an archipelago than contiguous land mass, naturally fit with the southern Philippines Moro belief that they were essentially independent of the central authority, through a false narrative lore of never having been fully conquered by the Spanish, Americans, or the Filipino Tagalogs of Luzon. Fundamentally, the current President Benigno Aquino administration developed a new paradigm of thought that envisioned successful ways, allowing for increased strategic options towards progress despite the requirement to meet a time-critical end before the completion of his constitutionally mandated one term administration.
Although the initial cause of the Muslim insurgency is not as important now as it once was, in particular considering changes in perspective over the four-plus decade struggle, it remains relevant to the mosaic of conflict and may now serve to identify where opportunities that were once lost have since been gained.
The Perils of Ignoring the Human Domain
The catalyst marking the beginning of the modern era of counterinsurgency in the conducted an initial assessment on the island of Basilan that indicated "the AFP did not view the population as the center of gravity, abuses were not uncommon, and corruption was endemic. In addition, AFP tactics were based on maneuver of battalionsized forces that were often unable to find and close with terrorists on the island." which would serve to isolate rebels from the Muslim populace, going on to report that "if their goal is to defeat the ASG and its foreign, mainly Indonesian, jihadi allies, they are casting the net too widely and creating unnecessary enemies." Their continued assessment is that mass-based insurgencies such as the Muslim MILF and MNLF versions rely on supportive populations, and that by "extension, small numbers of terrorists rely on sympathetic insurgents…counter-terrorism's central task in a setting like the one found in the Philippines is to isolate jihadis from their insurgent hosts -not divide insurgents from the population." Finally, in its closing argument, the report states:
This has come at a heavy price in Sulu, where no equivalent ceasefire machinery exists to separate jihadis from the dominant local guerrilla force, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Instead, heavy-handed offensives against ASG and its foreign jihadi allies have repeatedly spilled over into MNLF communities, driving some insurgents into closer cooperation with the terrorists, instead of with government.
Effective January 1, 2011, the AFP shifted its internal peace and security campaign to focus on the human domain and clearly articulated it in an open document entitled the Internal Peace and Security Plan "Bayinahan" (IPSP). Although a military plan, President Benigno S. Aquino III provided the opening message to the document and stated that "the ills confronting our nation are multi-faceted and complex. These can never be addressed through raising arms and wielding force against our democratic way of life as a nation. In the same vein, we recognize that a purely military solution will never be enough to adequately address the issues." 31 The plan reinforces the mandate that the primary duty of the Philippine government is to protect its population and articulates the principal role of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is as the protector of the people and state. The plan addresses the continued necessity for a whole-of-nation approach, beyond whole-of-government, to come to terms with and address the factors that lead to insurgency, "structural problems in Philippine society, such as unequal development, non-delivery of basic services, injustice, and poor governance-all of which are beyond the military's purview." 32 This is a critical concept and the reason it becomes one of the two foundational approaches in the plan.
The government indeed plays a critical role in the success of this strategy, but it cannot do so without the inclusion and support of the public sector. As a result, the entire nation is in effect trying to reach a solution to its own problems. Coincidentally, the second foundational approach is that of protecting the population, again directly related to the human domain. In fact, in the background of the IPSP, the AFP provides an early sense of perspective and how it will apply to security sector operations: "There is therefore a need for the military institution to re-imagine the concept of security to one that embraces a broader view of human security. Assuming the wider concept of human security will allow the AFP to assume a support role in the nation building efforts of the national government, subservient to the theme of peace and development." 33 This broader view of human security addresses the consideration of the human domain.
By extension, the desired strategic endstate became the well-being of the population.
That well-being of the population, earned from successful operations in the human domain, would then result in the stability of state institutions. Stable state institutions in turn then better enable the defense of territorial integrity, a core AFP mission, which serves to ensure the protection of sovereignty, a strategic focal point for the nation in light of territorial issues in the South China Sea. In short, this strategic change has allowed the AFP to better focus on its core task of protecting its nation, by protecting its population.
From that desired strategic end state, human well being, the GPH articulated four key elements of its National Strategic Policy, the ways in which it will attain its strategic end state: governance, delivery of basic services, economic reconstruction, and sustainable development and security sector reform. The means used to attain those ways come from a "whole-of-nation" approach, essentially a whole-of-government effort supported by private sector, and one which is "people-centered," focused on the human domain. Within the plan, elements of the public and private sector are assigned tasks representing the key components of the strategy. One of the strategic ways to attain objectives in the security sector reform category was to assign the Department of National Defense the task of defense and security. The IPSP is subsequently that 28 department's articulation of the national requirement, which conceptually captured the broader stakeholder involvement necessitated in all states of its creation.
As stated by the AFP, the IPSP is a shared, co-owned, and co-authored GPH efforts, personally led by President Aquino, effectively placed the onus on the population to determine the best response to the incident by strictly adhering to rule of law and employing a novel, human-centric approach. In nationally broadcast comments, President Aquino articulated that first and foremost, rule of law was important to the continued progress of the Philippines. He declared that individuals acting outside of that rule would be subject to arrest by the national police. What insurgents had done to AFP soldiers was first and foremost a crime and would be addressed as such. Finally, he stated that warrants would be appropriately generated under the Filipino legal framework. He termed this approach "all out justice" and it very quickly resonated with the population.
For the first time in countering the insurgency specific negative actors were identified and essentially isolated from law-abiding citizens by indirect influence. The population was specifically informed of who was wanted by police, why they were wanted, what crimes they were suspected of having committed, and as a result how they were accused of having broken Philippine law. Furthermore, it was quickly understood that they would get their day in court, unique from the longstanding wanted poster approach that mostly unsuccessfully pitted family member against family member. Almost immediately, tip lines began to receive more data enabling police forces to begin more specific and judicious operations within the human domain. As a result, numerous wanted criminals lost their ability to hide in plain sight amongst a neutral population and several were soon apprehended. Families felt more comfortable providing data on relatives because their faith in the legal system would provide justice.
Prior approaches, mostly unsuccessful, were for additional military forces to temporally saturate the area of contact and try to capture insurgents. Most often, none would be found, nor would locals feel free to support AFP efforts. The pattern of violence was therefore propagated by a failure to understand the nuances of how to best persistently operate within the domain in order to attain results through appropriate dominance of its key terrain, those insurgents who seemingly always lived to fight another day.
Implications for U.S. Strategic Landpower
We must recognize the human domain as principle and seek to understand its implications to how we operate. We ignore how the world has changed at our peril.
These gradual and generational changes of thought, concepts, technology, and globalization, have caused us to reach the tipping point of physical domain-centric thought. We must be prepared to influence within the human domain in as timely a manner as possible, either to deter conflict or quickly contain and eliminate it. We have reached the point where humans, all of them within an operating area, are much more than terrain, whether key or not. This change in perception and thought is fundamental, not nuanced, and as a result brings forth certain implications for the future that we must examine. That examination should be done in a comprehensive, detailed, but timely manner to ensure we're ready for operations and will not miss an opportunity.
Fortunately, the Army and U.S. Special Operations Command have identified this requirement and are moving forward with a combined body to explore strategic landpower. One of its focus areas will clearly be the human domain.
An initial task of the Office for Strategic Landpower should be to harmonize the efforts of the human domain communities of interest and analyze these implications.
We must truly study the components, physical and psychological, of human domain and adapt as necessary to apply the Army's perfectly suited core competencies to address our roles and missions. We should look at our doctrine and whether we have the proper organization to adapt. We must determine if we regionally align units towards locales, populations, or both. We should decide how to adapt our training to meet the demands of human domain operations by balancing the focus even more towards human factors like culture and communications mechanisms such as language and tools, psychology, and anthropological skills. We need to identify how our leaders prepare to function across the human domain and how we apply mission command to volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environments. We must identify how we get ourselves to where we need to be in order to best influence outcomes, to include better applying the tools we have and likely developing new ones that allow us to operate within areas, blend in, influence from within or afar, develop and maintain understanding, and better deal with humans. We should determine how we recruit the right talent and where it comes from within our own population and whether current recruitment practices allow us to meet projected human domain operational requirements. Finally, we must determine whether we're in the right places to influence the human domain. Are we properly arrayed, are we in the right bases, and are we postured to be in the right place at the right time to capitalize on opportunity?
Our Nation will retain its global role, one that benefits all Americans.
Globalization is upon us, and its full effects remain unknown. As stated in Joint
Operating Environment 2010, "The developed world recognizes that is has a major stake in the continuing progress of globalization…Nevertheless, one should not ignore the histories and passions of popular opinion in these states as they make their appearance…. A more peaceful, cooperative world is possible only if the pace of globalization continues." 39 We must know if understanding of the human domain, how 33 globalization and human security have met, will force us to make doctrinal, organizational, and equipment changes.
Conclusion
Our joint doctrine reminds us domains are interdependent. In a period of more focused resources, we should also examine whether we can focus our military doctrine to match those resources. As the human domain is the intersection of domains, a start is to focus there. As we are the force of strategic landpower, our risks towards not properly aiming that focus may be irrelevance at best, and mission failure at worst.
As our Nation's Army, we are the force of choice for and can accomplish our Nation's military objectives by properly employing the tools of strategic landpower. Our
Army remains "unique in its capability to deliver strategic effect through the taking and exercise of control" and uniquely suited to the exigencies of that task. We remain unique in our role, in that "no other grand strategic instrument, military or nonmilitary, can achieve a similar effect." 40 Properly trained, employed, and with a deep understanding of the myriad complexities of operating within the human domain, U.S.
strategic landpower can attain all objectives it seeks to attain in support of our National interests while maintaining the fundamental requirements of human security. Many types of operations involve considerations of operating in the human domain. Those include how to be precise in the use of force, empathy, cultural understanding while working alongside partner forces to support their objectives, the use of all mechanisms of a unified action approach, and operations through a comprehensive multi-lateral and interagency manner. U.S. strategic landpower is adaptable, flexible and solution-based.
It is well prepared to anticipate and meet operational requirements of international perspectives on human security that seek to require "people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthen the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities." 41 People-centered and protection are concepts we've long understood, and with a clear understanding of the importance and true essence of the human domain, we enhance our flexibility and subsequently our ability to influence a positive outcome in our endeavors.
U.S. landpower forces have always proven themselves capable of operating in such a manner to "spare civilians from the effects of hostilities…strict compliance…with international humanitarian law and, in particular, with the principles of distinction and proportionality…while taking all feasible precautions in attack and defense." 42 We understand this, but to focus on our operating environment is not enough. We must now, more than ever, focus on the human domain. We have certainly invested much effort over the past decade to better understand what it means to secure populations.
With the advent of the human domain, through the nexus of human security considerations and globalization, we must fully apply the myriad lessons we've learned and completely understand the advantage we'll be able to garner. This is particularly true outside major force-on-force conflict, today's wars, as we've come to fully grasp the significance of the protection of civilians, not defeating an enemy, is the end in itself that we'll most often seek to obtain. 43 We can, and will, do both. We live and operate within the human domain. Let's figure what that truly means, and how to best take advantage of the opportunities that have been presented us.
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